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An Empirical Investigation of the Interplay between Microcredit, Institutional 
Context and Entrepreneurial Capabilities  
 
Understanding under which conditions microcredit is used by new, growing ventures, 
is becoming increasingly pertinent to scholars. This paper investigates the interplay of 
the use of microcredit with entrepreneurial capabilities and the moderating role of 
institutional development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings show that higher 
constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities is associated with higher use of microcredit. 
In addition, we find that new, growing ventures use microcredit more where either 
economic or political institutions are less developed. Our findings suggest the 
importance of the existence of some type of institutional strength that must be in place 
to form the basis for microcredit activity. This allows for speculation as to whether 
microcredit works as the literature currently assumes. 
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurial activity is strongly influenced by the context it is embedded in (Baumol 
1990; 1993; Autio and Acs 2010; Welter 2011). Particularly in emerging markets, 
entrepreneurs face a number of challenges, such as the mixed success of innovation (Bradley, 
McMullen, Artz, and Simiyu 2012), weak institutions (Acemoglu 2003) and low human 
capital levels (Acs and Virgill 2010). One particular challenge for these entrepreneurs is 
access to finance (Honohan 2007) which can lead them into ‘poverty traps’ (Berthelemy and 
Varoudakis 1996), ultimately undermining their ability to freely choose among options (Gries 
and Naudé 2011) and pursue the goals they value (Alkire 2005).  A financial sector that is 
well developed, on the contrary, would give them the instrumental capability to more 
adequately participate in economic exchange (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross 2007; Sen 
1999).  
To respond to funding challenges that particularly characterize developing economies, 
the provision of microfinance to entrepreneurs has been regarded as an important part of the 
strategy through which livelihoods could be improved (Mair and Martí 2006; Peredo and 
McLean 2006; Khavul 2010). Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) pursue profit making 
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strategies that facilitate and support the ongoing activity of capital provision to entrepreneurs 
whilst also trying to extend their services and drive outreach (Morduch 1999; Fernando 
2006). By providing microcredit, savings, insurance and retirement plans, individuals are able 
to obtain capital which can be used to finance the creation and the survival of new ventures 
(Campbell 2010; Khavul 2010). As such, microcredit allows entrepreneurs to build assets and 
economic resources, whilst creating employment opportunities and services for local 
communities (Helms 2006). This can ultimately have an effect on individuals’ capabilities 
and the contexts entrepreneurs operate in (Mair and Marti 2009). 
Current debates in the microcredit and microfinance literature have focused on the 
dynamics through which microcredit is deployed, particularly to women, as well as its 
effectiveness (cfr. among others Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Milanov, Justo, and 
Bradley 2015; Chliova, Brinckmann, and Rosenbusch 2015), how microfinance institutions 
function (cfr. among others, Morduch 1999; Armendariz and Morduch 2007) as well as their 
level of sustainability (cfr. among others, Morduch 2000; Gonzales- Vega 1994), and their 
ability to shape the context they operate in (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti, 2006; Khavul, 
Chavez and Bruton 2013). Research has also indicated that institutional quality determines 
the performance of MFIs in periods of financial crisis (Silva and Chávez 2015), and that 
institutions influence how entrepreneurial finance is channelled to entrepreneurs in 
developing economies (Eid 2005). However, Beck (2007) and, McKenzie and Woodruff 
(2008) indicate that small and medium sized businesses, often called “missing middle,” offer 
high returns on investments in these contexts. Yet, they remain underserved financially and 
overlooked by researchers. We also know that empirical access to finance is a critical issue 
for firms in developing economies and microcredit is a particularly type of high-risk debt 
which may not always be sought after (George 2005; Hulme 2000).   
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In addition, if context shapes entrepreneurship and sets the boundaries for 
entrepreneurial action (Welter 2011), it is not clear a) whether ventures using microcredit are 
those whose capabilities are constrained the most by the environment they operate in, and b) 
under which institutional conditions these ventures actually use microfinance to fund their 
business needs. The question about when and where entrepreneurs decide to pursue or forgo 
the option of using microfinance loans still remains unanswered (Khavul 2010). In this paper, 
we ask the following question: how do formal institutions shape the use of microcredit by 
firms with varying entrepreneurial capabilities? To answer these questions, our empirical 
analysis focuses on the use of microcredit by firms in Sub Saharan Africa, characterized as a 
context with a high level of constrained capabilities. Often viewed as institutionally 
homogenous (Rivera-Santos et al., 2015), we highlight the institutional heterogeneity of this 
context and the varying capabilities associated with it. We test predictions using data from 
the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, the Economic Freedom of the World Report index 
(2011), as well as the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008). Our 
findings indicate that microcredit is indeed used in areas where individuals’ entrepreneurial 
capabilities are more constrained. At the same time, in these contexts microcredit tends to be 
mostly used where there is either a well-developed market or a well-functioning political-
judicial system which guarantee a minimal “rule of game”. It is only under those institutional 
conditions that firms, constrained by their capabilities, are prone to/can use microcredit to 
finance their business activities.  
We aim at making a number of contributions. From an academic perspective, we unfold 
the relationship between the use of microcredit by new, growing ventures in contexts 
characterized by underdeveloped institutions. This has been overlooked by past work in the 
area. By shedding light on the conditions under which this form of finance is used, we seek to 
illuminate the challenges associated with policy interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa (Obeng 
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and Blundel 2013). At a practitioner’s level, our work helps understand where microcredit is 
mostly used by new ventures in the “missing middle”. In making such arguments, we argue 
that areas with the most constrained entrepreneurial capabilities require more radical 
structural change if individuals are to realise their entrepreneurial potential and ultimately 
contribute to economic growth. In this vein, we believe that this provides useful evidence to 
the microfinance industry regarding how their interventions may be most usefully channeled 
towards potential entrepreneurial talent.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we conceptualise the conditions under which 
new ventures are more likely to use microcredit to fund their operations. To do so, we use 
Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach to look at individual firms capabilities and how these 
influence new firms in using microcredit. Second, we discuss our methodological approach to 
assembling a dataset. Finally, we present our  results and discuss their implications, 
concluding with suggestions on future research opportunities. 
2. Theoretical Background 
Sen’s (1999, 2005) ‘capabilities approach’ introduced the notion that development 
should be conceptualized as freedoms, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained 
in their ability to act. Because individuals have ideas about the type of lives they want to live, 
they act in accordance with such aims (Sen 1999). Following the capabilities approach, 
antecedents and consequences of individual circumstances can be highlighted using non-
monetary indicators: capability constraints need to be understood with respect to the 
individual’s freedom, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their abilities to 
do or to be (Alkire 2005). In the capabilities approach, a person’s freedom refers to the 
genuine opportunity to realize whatever it is that they are trying to achieve (Alkire, 2005). 
This, in turn, determines ‘what they do’ (Anand et al., 2009). Building on Sen’s (1999) 
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argument, Nambiar (2013) further reports that capabilities are synonymous with individuals 
feeling constrained or enabled by their immediate circumstances whereas Robeyns (2005), 
Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) indicate that it is an individual’s environment which 
creates heterogeneities in capabilities. Severely restricted capabilities are therefore associated 
with an inability to act in accordance with ones’ aims.  
Prior work shows that context is particularly important in shaping entrepreneurial 
capabilities: by setting boundaries, it can be the space for the emergence of opportunities 
whilst also placing limitations upon them  (Welter 2011; Estrin, Korostelevab, and 
Mickiewiczc 2013). Context influences enterprising activities at the intersection of different 
levels of analysis, situating theories and empirical patterns within their natural settings 
(Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad 2014). Evans (2002) and Sen (1999), among others, 
indicate that the institutional context indeed influences capability development. Both Sen 
(2005) and Nussbaum (2000) explain that expanding individual freedoms are central to 
advancing capabilities; this expansion is guided by institutional frameworks. The proposition 
here is that institutional development impacts freedoms, such as those related to economic 
opportunities, property, finance, and other basic services (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 2001; 
Stiglitz, 1998), and this impact capability development. On the one hand, as Robeyns (2005) 
reports, the capabilities of entrepreneurs requires appreciating that there are heterogeneities in 
their abilities to achieve their aims. On the other hand, institutional failure can increase 
transaction costs which limit the appropriability of entrepreneurial rents, reducing the 
perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities and leading to suppression of 
entrepreneurial activity (Baker et al., 2005). 
The development of financial insitutions, which provide adequate financial services, is 
categorised by Sen (1999) as an instrumental capability. Contexts where financial insitutions 
are underdeveloped contribute to the creation of ‘poverty traps’ (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 
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1996) as it reduces the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities. This, in turn, 
hinders the ability of individuals to adequately participate in economic exchange and overall 
capabilities (Sen 1999). Microcredit developed in contexts characterised by limited access to 
resources (Peredo and Chrismas, 2006) as a solution for individuals who are constrained by 
the environment, which inhibits the pursuit of lucrative opportunities (Sen 2005). As such, 
microcredit acts as a means towards the expansion of entrepreneurs’ capabilities (Ansari, 
Munir and Gregg 2012) who can incrementally improve their capabilities of achieving small 
scale solutions to macro social problems (Moyo 2009). This leads to the formulation of the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where capabilities 
are constrained. 
Microcredit was initiated as a solution to the financial need of entrepreneurs in 
developing countries with no access to financial services. The inability of these individuals to 
offer the necessary collateral to access traditional financial intermediaries (Umoh, 2006) 
coupled with limited property rights, lack of employment, and a verifiable credit history 
resulted in extremely high transaction costs for lenders, namely interest rates and repayment 
plans (De Soto 2000; Yunus 1999). Under these institutional conditions, market exchange is 
typically trust-based with entrepreneurs relying on personal networks for business 
(Fafchamps 1997, 2001) rather than market-based mechanisms.  
The weakness of markets, namely economic institutions (North 1987), creates 
uncertainty. Uncertainty makes resource allocation decisions difficult and compounds an 
entrepreneur’s inability for wealth creation (Seelos 2007). Major consequences of this are 
that the appropriability of entrepreneurial rents become limited, perceived attractiveness of 
entrepreneurial opportunities is reduced, and entrepreneurial activity may be suppressed 
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(Baker et al., 2005). As such, the inadequate development of financial services reduces the 
perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities, hindering the ability of individuals 
to adequately participate in economic exchange (Sen 1999).  
In the spirit of the microfinance movement, loans are designed to facilitate 
entrepreneurs to engage more effectively in the market. MFIs provide entrepreneurs financial 
capital which enables them to penetrate markets (Baker et al., 2005) or to create new ones 
(Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2013. Although indebtedness may determine the nature of the 
opportunities being pursued, we know that it tends not impact upon an entrepreneurs 
willingness to take loans for working capital purposes (Dichter 2007, Bradley et al., 2012). 
As such, entrepreneurs tend to be willing to accept the risks associated with capturing 
opportunities when they have access to greater financial capital (Evans and Leighton 1989). 
This allows entrepreneurs to view the appropriability of their context more positively, 
ultimately increasing returns and the venture’s ability to survive in the long-term (Baker et 
al., 2005; Montgomery 2005). These arguments thus lead us to formulate the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where economic 
institutions are less developed. 
 In addition to economic institutions, North (1987) argues that political-judicial 
institutions provide the necessary structures of law which allow for the enforcement of 
property rights. These are especially important for entrepreneurs who need clear indications 
about the residual claimants for the returns they may generate (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 
2004). Strong legal environments contribute to national economic growth (North 1987; 
Rigobon and Rodrik 2005) since they allow wealth producers to form expectations about 
value creation (Scully 1988; McMullen 2011) and to effectively innovate (Acemoglu and 
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Robinson 2012), while facilitating adequate development of the financial system (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997; Levine 1998).  
Institutional weakness arises from lapsed legal frameworks and corrupted contexts 
which is driven by limited accountability. Corruption hinders the formation of human capital 
necessary for economic growth and development (Becker, 1964, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994) 
and erodes the institutional capacity of government to deliver public services. In addition, 
Aidis et al., (2012) show that economic returns to entrepreneurs are lower when corruption is 
higher. This is due to the increased uncertainty stemming from unnecessary bureaucracy and 
the imposition of severe financial constraints on entrepreneurs (Anokhin and Schulze 2009). 
Corruption thus reduces economic investments, distorts markets, hinders competition and 
creates inefficiencies by increasing the costs of doing business (Pak Hung 2001). These type 
of environments are a common feature in the developing world (Easterly 2001b, Moyo 2009, 
North 1970) and result in both individual capabilities (Gupta et al., 2002) and economic 
incentives for entrepreneurial action being impacted and reduced. 
In the context of MFIs, Massey (2011) finds that corruption does not affect the ability 
of MFIs to lend. This suggests that MFIs may not be refrained from lending to ventures 
operating in environments with less developed political-judicial institutions. However, the 
amount of financial capital utilised by such firms tends to be driven by their willingness to 
take loans and engage with the MFI, as well as by the uncertainty that corrupt contexts bring. 
For microcredit borrowers, weak political-judicial institutions and the presence of corruption 
represent a key part of the appropriability of that national context – whether they perceive 
there to be potential for profit given aspects of the institutional environment (Baker et al., 
2005). In effect, political-judicial systems have an instrumental role for businesses and their 
absence or weakness leads to serious uncertaintities (Sen 1999). One consistent logic of 
microcredit is the group lending methodology which gives borrowers collective support 
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through local networks. This acts as what Lawrence et al. (2002) describe as “proto-
institutions” – network arrangements which substitute for a lack of formal institutions and 
help to avoid the negative implications associated with bribery and weak legal systems 
(Khanna and Palepu 1997; Webb et al., 2010). This network effect has similarly been 
identified in the absence of the group lending methodology because it provides a level of 
network legitimacy in an entrepreneur’s set of exchange relationships by signalling to other 
members of the market (Viswanathan et al., 2010). As such, the use of microcredit allows 
entrepreneurs to substitute for the weakness in political-judicial institutions. Based on the 
preceding argument, entrepreneurs are likely to survive and prosper when they make greater 
use of microcredit. In contexts that threaten this progress, the use of microcredit is a vital tool 
to this end. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where political-
judicial institutions are less developed. 
Although the rationale of microcredit is to lend to those entrepreneurs operating 
in contexts with constrained capabilities, institutions are complex and heterogeneous. 
Roth and Kostova (2003) highlight the particular existence of “institutional 
imperfections” in developing economies; such heterogeneity should be understood with 
respect of a blend of developed and under-developed formal institutions.  As 
demonstrated by Nambiar (2013), the development of an institutional context may only 
partially enable one aspect of capabilities whilst simultaneously being restrictive 
elsewhere. Thus, we expect to see a complex constellation of broader institutional 
factors associated with diverse restrictions on capability constraints. This concerns the 
immediate environmental “conversion factors” (Sen, 1999) that define an 
entrepreneur’s capabilities as well as the broader presence of regulative institutional 
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characteristics that interact to determine the usage of microcredit. As such, we suggest 
that there must be some form of development in existing economic and/or political-
judicial institutions which allows new ventures to access microcredit. However, the 
combination of the elements of the institutional framework which produce these 
outcomes has been overlooked. Bringing together hypothesis 1 through to hypothesis 3, 
we formulate following new hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: New ventures are more likely to use microcredit in environments 
characterized by high constrained capabilities where economic institutions are 
more (less) developed and political-judicial institutions less (more) developed. 
3. Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we used data by the World Bank through its annual Enterprise 
Survey. We focused on countries in Sub Saharan Africa since this has been consistently 
depicted as one of the areas with seriously restricted capabilities. In particular, the World 
Bank (2011) reports an  increase in Sub-Saharan urban population by 114 percent between 
1990 and 2009, and an increase in people living with less than $1 a day by 183 percent; also, 
the average life expectancy at birth results to be 52.5 years, compared with 71.5 years for 
North Africa and 69.2 years for the world. Still, the prevalence of HIV for people aged 15-49 
is nearly 7 times the world’s average (World Bank, 2011). 
Twenty seven Sub-Saharan countries were included in the survey. The Enterprise 
Surveys collect firm level information on the business environment, how it is perceived by 
individual firms, how it changes over time, and the various constraints to firm performance 
and growth (World Bank 2011). Firm level data is available from 2002; however, since data 
prior to 2006 were collected by different units within the World Bank and employed different 
survey questions for different countries, our analysis focuses on data collected from 2006. In 
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addition, the Enterprise Survey is addressed to operating businesses that employ a minimum 
of 5 employees; this eliminates most of the subsistence-driven and self-employment forms of 
entrepreneurship, something that Karnani (2007) has defined as “misguiding” in that the 
focus on subsistence entrepreneurship does not help us in understanding and/or explaining 
economic development. Similarly, Mead and Liedholm (1998) have shown that within an 
African context small and medium sized enterprises generate significantly more jobs than 
larger scale enterprises yet remain chronically underfunded. By concentrating on ventures 
with 5 or more employees, we are able to focus on the “missing middle” of the microfinance 
sector which have the greatest potential for driving economic growth and is consistently 
under researched (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002). To date, this is a group of entrepreneurs 
who have received sparse attention within the microfinance literature, which has heavily 
focused on microfinance institutions themselves rather than on recipients of their services 
(cfr. among others, Mair and Marti, 2006; Moss, Neubaum, and Meyskens, 2015; Silva and 
Chavez, 2015).  
   For what concerns our conceptualization of entrepreneurship as new ventures, 
consistent with prior research in both developed and developing countries, we limited our 
analysis to those firms that were not part of larger firms and were less than 10 years old 
(Benson 2001; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Reuber and Fischer 2002; BarNir, Gallaugher, and 
Auger 2003; Park and Bae 2004; Bhagavatula, Elfring, Van Tilburg, and Van de Bunt 2010). 
Based on these parameters, our sample size for analysis was 5255 out of the 16847 firms in 
the original Enterprise Survey dataset. 
3.1 Measures 
We measured the use of microcredit by new ventures using an indicator of whether a firm 
used microcredit to finance its working capital. The relevant question from the survey (K3) 
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asked respondents to estimate, over the latest fiscal year, the proportion of their 
establishment’s working capital that was financed from a range of sources: (a) internal funds / 
retained earnings, (b) borrowed from banks, (c) borrowed from non-financial institutions, (d) 
purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers, and (e) other 
(moneylenders, friends, relatives, etc.). Because only a portion of the surveyed firm’s 
purchased fixed assets in any given year, we focused on the financing of working capital. 
This represents a recurrent decision for new firms and readily applies to all respondents in the 
survey. In the sample, the percentage of microcredit used to finance working capital varied 
between zero and one hundred and was provided in the original World Bank dataset as an 
integer over that range. We converted that into a proportion measure. Since only 4 percent of 
the sample firms made use of microcredit, we created an indicator variable for our main 
analysis, based on whether a firm used microcredit. Nevertheless, we used the proportion in 
supplementary analysis.  
One relevant consideration for the validity of our measure pertains to cases where the 
entrepreneurs may not actively look for microcredit funding. The pecking order hypothesis 
from the finance literature suggests that, if available, internal funds are typically the first 
option for financing a business (Myers and Majluf 1984). Therefore, in our analyses, we seek 
to tease out this explanation of the variability in the proportion of microcredit used by 
modelling the availability of internal funds / retained earnings as an endogenous 
characteristic of the firm and controlling for the probability of self-seleciton into the category 
of firms with no sufficient internal funds, i.e. those who are likely to look for external options 
such as microcredit.  
We measure capability constraints at the level of the individual firm following Sen’s 
(1999, 2005) capability approach and focusing on the perceived constraints to the 
entrepreneurs’ functioning, i.e., the pursuit of valuable activities and positive choices that the 
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entrepreneur is able to make concerning the operation of his/her business. Our measure of 
capability constraints is as a composite of the degree to which the following were perceived 
as obstacles: telecommunication, electricity, transportation, access to land, inadequately 
educated labor force, crime theft and disorder, tax administration, customs and trade 
regulations, labor regulations, business licensing and permits, and practices of competitors in 
the informal sector. These factors are argued important for the entrepreneurial process in 
developing economies because they can affect the degree to which the potential value of 
opportunities is appropriable (Baker et al., 2005). ‘Hard’ (e.g. transportation, 
telecommunications, electricity) and ‘soft’ (education systems, business environment, taxes) 
infrastructure constraints can reduce the capabilities of entrepreneurs to create value as profits 
are eroded into sections of the economy outside of the entrepreneur’s control (Khanna and 
Palepu 1997). The data for these items came from the Enterprise Survey. For each of these 
issues, respondents indicated on 5 point scale (from “no obstacle” to “very severe obstacle”) 
the degree to which it constituted an obstacle to the current operations of their establishment. 
We then used these items to create a reflective indicator of “capabilities constraints.” The 
overall reliability (alpha) of the scale was 0.77. 
We measured development of economic institutions as a composite of several country-
level factors, obtained from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
(2008). We included the scores of four main pillars of the competitiveness index – goods 
market efficiency, financial market sophistication, market size, and business sophistication – 
as well as the score for the intensity of local competition. In deriving the scale we used the 
standardised value of each component. We then used these items to create a reflective 
indicator of “development of economic institutions.” The reliability (alpha) of the scale was 
0.94. 
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We measured development of political-judicial institutions as a composite of several 
country-level factors, obtained from several sources. First, we used data from the Economic 
Freedom of the World Report index (2011) on the legal environment and corruption for each 
country and survey year. This approach was consistent with prior research both in developed 
and developing countries (Wan and Hoskisson 2003; Christa 2008; De Clercq and Dakhli 
2009; Gwartney, Lawson and Hall, 2015; Sobel 2008; Smets and Knack, 2016). In particular 
we used area two of the index, which covers legal structure and the security of property 
rights. Its individual components include judicial independence, impartial courts, protection 
of property rights, military interference in rule of law and the political process, integrity of 
the legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, and regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property. The index score varies from one (the weakest) to ten (the strongest). We also used 
the index for item 5Cv of the Business Regulation section, which provides a score for extra 
payments and bribery. The score varies from one (the weakest) to ten (the strongest), with 
higher value suggesting that corruption is less problematic. Second, we used the corruption 
perception index from Transparency International for each country and survey year. Finally, 
we used data from the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008) on the 
first pillar (Institutions) of the Competitiveness Index as well as, from the detailed profile of 
each country, on the degree to which corruption was perceived as a problematic factor for 
doing business in the country. In deriving the scale we used the standardised value of each 
component. The reliability (alpha) of the scale was 0.90.    
We control for a number of variables in order to rule out alternative explanations for 
variations in the usage of microfinance. At the country level, we controlled for each country’s 
Human Development Index (from the United Nations), to factor out the country’s overall 
level of development (Chliova, Brinckmann, and Rosenbusch, 2015). At the level of the firm, 
we firstly controlled for its status as sole proprietorship since this is the most commonly used 
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legal arrangement in developing countries (Umoh, 2006). Secondly, we control for the 
highest educational attainment of the owners since human capital affects firm outcomes in 
developing economies (Bradley et al., 2012; Umoh, 2006). Thirdly, we control for number of 
employees (logged) and annual sales (logged) as indicators of firm performance (Bruton et 
al., 2011). Lastly, we controlled for whether it was in a manufacturing sector as an indicator 
of industry which can have implications for the survival and performance of firms (Shane 
2003). We include a summary table of all of our measures in Table 1.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
3.2 Analysis 
Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, i.e., whether a firm uses microcredit or not 
to fund its working capital needs, we used a logit model in our main estimation and a robust 
option for calculating the standard error in order to deal with possible heteroskedasticity in 
the data. We also performed several supplementary analyses to establish the robustness of our 
results. First, in consideration of the excessive number of zeros in our data, we estimated a 
tobit model, for which we used the proportion of microcredit as the dependent variable. 
Second, we considered whether a firm financed its working capital entirely by internal funds / 
retained earnings. One might argue that the decision to rely entirely on internal funds may be 
driven by factors related to the external environment of the firm, thereby intersecting the 
realm of our theory. In order to ensure that such endogeneity in the funding decisions of the 
ventures in our sample did not bias our estimation, we estimated our model on the sub-sample 
of firms not entirely financed by internal funds and included a self-selection correction 
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(Heckman 1979) for the firms’ reliance on internal funds. The correction was based on a 
probit estimation of whether a firm was entirely financed by internal finds, from which we 
derived the expected probabilities that a firm was not entirely financed by internal funds, to 
use as control variable in the estimation.   
4. Results 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in the 
analyses. As per our theorizing, this shows a very low correlation between capability 
constraints and our measurement of institutions. The correlation of capabilities with market 
environment is .07, with legal-judicial institutions -.01 and with human-development index 
.11.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
In Table 3 we provide the results of the logit estimation. In Model 1 we include only our 
control variables. In Model 2, we include the main effects for development of economic 
environment, development of legal-judicial institutions, and capability constraints. In Model 
3, we include the individual interaction effects of economic environment and legal-judicial 
institutions with capability constraints. Finally, in Model 5 we include the joint interaction 
effect of economic environment and legal-judicial institutions with capability constraints.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
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In Model 2, the main effects of market environment and legal-judicial institutions were 
negative and significant in the model (β = -.47, p < .001 and β = -.41, p < .001, respectively), 
suggesting that firms are less likely to use microcredit in more developed environments. The 
main effect for capability constraints was positive and significant (β = .39, p < .001). This 
suggests that the use of microcredit is more likely when ventures operate with constrained 
capabilities. In Model 3, the individual interactions of market environment and legal-judicial 
institutions with capability constraints did not improve the fit of the model and were not 
significant.  
In Model 4, the addition of the joint interaction effect of market environments and 
legal-judicial institutions significantly improved the fit of the model (ΔChi-square = 11.2 
(2df), p < .01). The three-way interaction effect was negative and significant (β = -1.299, p < 
.05). In order to understand the nature of the interaction we plotted the effect of capability 
constraints on the likelihood of using microcredit for four different development 
combinations of market environment and legal-judicial institutions: high-high, high-low, low-
high, and high-high. The interaction plot is shown in Figure 1. The plot shows that the 
relationship between capabilities constrains and the use of microcredit is positive when 
market environment is more developed and the legal-judicial institutions less developed, and 
negative in the other two combinations, when they are both more or less developed.  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
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Our robustness estimations of Model 4 from Table 3 are shown in Table 4. Model 1 
presents the tobit estimation of the proportion of microcredit used by the firms. The three-
way interaction effect of market environment, legal-judicial institutions, and capability 
constraints is negative and marginally significant (β = -.32, p < .10). This effect as well as the 
overall results is consistent with our main estimation. In Model 2, we present the logit 
estimation on the subset of ventures that were not financed by internal funds, while 
controlling for their endogenous self-selection into that category. Again, the three-way 
interaction effect is negative and marginally significant (β = -1.129, p < .10) and consistent 
with our main estimation. These findings corroborate the robustness of our results.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
5. Discussion, Limitations and Future Research 
Scholars have consistently linked entrepreneurial activity with economic growth. However, in 
developing countries individuals often lack the capabilities to access the market and obtain 
capital to fund new business opportunities. Acknowledging these challenges, microcredit 
developed to provide small amount of loans to allow such individuals to efficiently engage in 
economic exchange, build their ventures thus making wider economic contributions 
(McMullen 2011). However, entrepreneurship researchers have argued that contextual 
factors, both at the individual and institutional level, augment entrepreneurial activity 
(Baumol 1990; Estrin et al., 2013).  
This paper highlights the contextual conditions under which new, growing ventures use 
microcredit. These ventures are classified as the “missing middle” and have been overlooked 
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by mainstream academic research and practitioners’ work, where a focus has been on 
individuals receiving microcredit for subsistence purposes and/or to develop micro-
enterprises (Beck 2007). Yet, we know that microcredit developed as a solution to offer 
individuals the necessary financial instruments that would enable building entrepreneurial 
capabilities by developing new businesses. As such, this “missing middle” represents smaller 
firms within developing economies that have limited financial options even though they may 
offer returns on investments in these contexts (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008) and potentially 
provide much more significant economic externalities in terms of job and wealth creation 
(Karnani 2007). Although the term “missing middle” has been used for some time, there is 
very little research on this group of firms even though they’re becoming a more prominent 
part of the microfinance picture and have a more significant economic impact than their 
micro counterparts (Khavul et al., 2013).  
Because Sub-Saharan Africa is a region characterized by high constraints to individual 
capabilities and little attention has been paid to heterogeneity of capabilities across the 
continent (Rivera-Santos et al., 2013), our empirical analysis focuses on the use of 
microcredit in “missing middle” ventures in such countries. Specifically, we examine the 
degree to which microcredit is utilized by new ventures as a function of the country’s 
institutional environment, measured as the development of economic and political 
institutions, and of the degree of constraints to a firm’s capabilities, measured by the 
fruitfulness of the commercial environment. We then argue that microcredit is more likely to 
be used by those ventures that have higher restrictions to their capabilities only when there is 
some institutional arrangement, either at an economic or political-judicial level that sets “the 
rules of the game.” 
Our empirical results suggest that microcredit is indeed used by these new, missing 
middle ventures in contexts that present challenges both at the firm and institutional level of 
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analysis. The identification of a positive effect between the use of microcredit and the 
constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities reinforces Sen’s (1999) view and the notion that 
microcredit facilitates access to capital for those entrepreneurs that operate in regions with 
the most restricted capabilities. However, our results also show this happens only when there 
are the appropriate supporting institutional mechanisms, further suggesting that contextual 
features of the institutional environment shape microfinance activity. Particularly, the use of 
microcredit by the “missing middle” increases in contexts characterized by restricted 
capabilities and either a) well (less) developed economic (political-judicial) institutions, or b) 
less (well) developed economic (political-judicial) institutions. The underdevelopment of 
economic institutions can prevent entrepreneurs from forming contracts, ultimately increasing 
business uncertainty and compounding their ability to create wealth (Seelos 2007). This is 
theoretically consistent with the Mair and Marti (2009) argument who assert that MFIs act as 
institutional entrepreneurs in contexts of institutional weakness left open by underdeveloped 
economic institutions. Similarly, contexts where political-judicial institutions are 
characterized by high levels of corruption raise the fundamental threat of rent and asset 
expropriation, generating uncertainty in the business environment. This uncertainty 
undermines entrepreneurial aspirations of individuals and has a stronger effects on new 
ventures than on established ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In such contexts, 
institutions in charge of transferring resources to one party to another, and designed to serve 
on behalf of the government or the people (including, thus, the government itself), may not be 
answerable to their principals.  
However, our results also do show that we should consider the interaction between 
development of economic and political insitutions to fully understand the use of microcredit 
by new, growing firms, and that heterogeneity of capabilities drives such relationship. 
Particularly, microcredit may help shape insitutional contexts characterized by heterogeneous 
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capabilities, but foundational institutional support is needed in order to tackle such capability 
problems. Whereas prior work (Khavul et al., 2013; Mair and Marti, 2006; Mair, Marti, and 
Ventresca, 2012) has indicated that microcredit is used in contexts where only economic 
instutitions are to be developed, our work shows that there must be some formal institutional 
political framework in place for entrepreneurs to use microcredit in such contexts. Without it, 
the developmental role of microcredit may be overstated.  
At the same time, we also show that microcredit is used in contexts where there is 
development of economic institutions. Yet, we identify that the use of microcredit is to be 
found in contexts with stronger economic institutions and weak political ones. It is precisely 
this interaction between developed economic institutions and underdevelopment of political 
ones that the literature has not addressed this far. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw the 
distinction between extractive and inclusive institutions, arguing that extractive contexts (e.g. 
autocratic rule/weak governance) can have strong economic institutions. However, because 
these are less open politically, they may deter potentially novel businesses that spur economic 
growth. If microcredit is utilized by capability constrained firms in potentially extractive 
contexts, this suggests that the entrepreneurial activity being stimulated, even within the 
“missing middle”, may be less productive for economic development (Baumol 1990).  Our 
work, therefore, highlights the institutional conditions within which microcredit is used to 
fund the development of new entrepreneurial opportunities: if less favorable political contexts 
may lead entrepreneurs to capture opportunities which are less conducive to the overall 
development of the economy, the impact of microcredit in these nations may be somehow 
minimalistic. Conversely, in more politically inclusive economies, microcredit may help spur 
the creation of more competitive and innovative markets which can help diversify markets 
beyond the basic services (e.g. food goods, provisions) often provided (Banerjee 2007). As 
such, the relationship between the nature of the institutional environment and the type of 
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business opportunity pursued in the microfinance industry would be an interesting avenue for 
further study. Indeed, further study needs to dig deeper into the role of informal institutions in 
this process.     
Overall, this encourages us to consider whether the relationship between microcredit, 
entrepreneurship and capabilities works as the literature currently assumes – microcredit is 
used by entrepreneurs in the most resource constrained environments where only economic 
institutions are to be shaped. As such, our findings suggests a more complex picture than 
extant research currently suggests and contribute to a better understanding of the use of 
microcredit at the level of the firm receiving it (Silva and Chávez 2015), with a need to 
consider institutional heterogeneities both within and across developing countries (Roth and 
Kostova 2003) and the interaction between a complex constellation of factors of institutions 
and capabilities (Nambiar 2013). It is therefore of key importance for future work to 
understand the dynamics through which microcredit is developed in contexts characterized by 
political institutional weakness. From a political perspective, most research has focused on 
the role of regulation in the microfinance sector (Cull et al., 2011) without considering the 
other aspects of political institutions we have theorized, and empirically identified, here. This 
would help scholars and practitioners alike in gaining a better understanding how microcredit 
works in varying political environments.  
 From a policy perspective our findings which suggest that new ventures need  some 
level of institutional support to be able to pursue and fulfil their entrepreneurial aspirations, 
something that has strong implications given the recent political upheaval in North Africa, the 
Middle East and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. In post-conflict contexts, often characterised by 
the lowest level of capability development, and where political institutions (or economic 
ones) are still in the process of being redefined and shaped, the intervention of MFIs may be 
of key importance in stimulating entrepreneurial activity and the economy in some of the 
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most challenging contexts. Emerging evidence suggests that many nations in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and beyond are developing the appropriate institutions through which financial 
institutions can stimulate the private sector (Naudé 2010). Microcredit could be an 
appropriate tool for augmenting entrepreneurial activity in those environments where 
individuals lack the basic individual and institutional infrastructure to fulfil their aspirations. 
As such, the ability of entrepreneurs to have access to improved instrumental capabilities is 
likely to be shaped by how varying institutional arrangements support them, determining 
where investors see scalable operations and therefore the diversity of financial services at the 
disposal of entrepreneurs.  
  Aside from the contribution and further reflection that our results stimulate, there are 
limitations to our study that need to be considered in any further extrapolation from our 
results. First, the study was cross sectional in nature and, as such, cannot make a reliable 
inference on the direction of the interplay between the effectiveness of the provision of 
microcredit on capabilities or on the institutional development over time. The nature of our 
data enabled us to study only the use of microcredit as a function of capability constraints, 
but a promising and much needed extension of the work concerns the reverse relationship, i.e. 
how the use of microcredit helps in improving entrepreneurial capabilities. Second, while 
large scale data are difficult to collect on this topic, the availability of the Enterprise Survey 
has enabled us to throw a glimpse at the use of microcredit across a large group of African 
countries. At the same time, as is true for any secondary dataset, the data offer limited insight 
into the conditions and rationale under which microcredit was (or was not) obtained. We 
hope that our insights can stimulate further research that would seek to elucidate this 
mechanism through more suitable research designs.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we asked, how do formal institutions shape the use of microcredit by 
firms with varying entrepreneurial capabilities? Our results demonstrate a need to consider 
the development of economic institutions – as extant research suggests – but also the 
development of political institutions to fully understand the use of microcredit by firms in 
Sub Saharan Africa’s “missing middle”. Importantly, our results underline the need for some 
kind of supporting institutional mechanism to allow entrepreneurs with restricted capabilities 
to use micocredit.  
As the challenge of assessing the conditions under which microcredit is utilised 
continues, this paper offers one perspective in understanding this relationship from a firm and 
institutional level perspective. Our findings point to the severe challenges facing 
entrepreneurs using microcredit in developing economies where institutional contexts have to 
be developed. In order to spur entrepreneurial action through the provision of microcredit, the 
task may rest at the door of policy makers and the international community whose decisions 
will shape the long term future of both the microfinance industry and of the entrepreneurial 
activity.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Constructs and Measures 
 
Construct Measures References 
Capability Constraints Obstacles: Telecommunication, electricity, transportation, access to land, 
inadequately educated labor force, crime theft and disorder, tax 
administration, customs and trade regulations, labor regulations, business 
licensing and permits, and practices of competitors in the informal sector. 
 
(Baker et al. 2005; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 
Robeyns, 2005; Sen, 1999) 
Political-Judicial 
Institutions 
Judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property rights, 
military interference in rule of law and the political process, integrity of the 
legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the 
sale of real property, extra payments and bribery, corruption perceived as a 
problematic factor for doing business.  
 
(Economic Freedom of the World Report 
Index 2011; Wan and Hoskisson 2003; 
Christa 2008; De Clercq and Dakhli 2009; 
Sobel 2008; World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 2008). 
Economic Institutions Goods market efficiency, financial market sophistication, market size, and 
business sophistication, intensity of local competition 
(World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 5,255) 
 
 
Note: Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.027 are significant at p < .05 
 
 
Mean St.dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Use of microcredit 0.04 0.20 1.00
2 Capability constraints -0.13 0.52 0.06 1.00
3 Market environment -0.11 0.88 -0.05 0.07 1.00
4 Legal-judicial institutions 0.10 0.80 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
5 Human development index 0.40 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.44 0.51 1.00
6 Sole proprietorship 0.73 0.45 -0.06 -0.07 0.17 -0.21 -0.12 1.00
7 Education of owner 5.13 2.16 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.17 0.26 -0.33 1.00
8 Employees (log) 2.10 0.98 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.18 0.06 -0.30 0.32 1.00
9 Sales (log) 16.52 2.37 0.04 -0.04 -0.21 0.06 -0.07 -0.27 0.27 0.45 1.00
10 Manufacturing 0.24 0.43 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.00
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TABLE 3 
Logit Estimation of the Whether Firms Use Microcredit 
 
 
 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
  
Coef. Std.	Err. Coef. Std.	Err. Coef. Std.	Err. Coef. Std.	Err.
Capability	constraints 0.390 (0.12) *** 0.486 (0.14) *** 0.517 (0.14) ***
Market	environment -0.470 (0.09) *** -0.475 (0.09) *** -0.375 (0.11) ***
Legal-judicial	institutions -0.413 (0.10) *** -0.405 (0.10) *** 0.008 (0.18)
Market	env.	X	Cap.	constraints 0.236 (0.15) 0.083 (0.17)
Legal-jud.	Inst.	X	Cap.	constraints -0.036 (0.09) -0.578 (0.23) *
Market	env.	X	Legal-jud.	Inst. 0.786 (0.39) *
Market	env.	X	Legal-jud.	Inst.	X	Cap.	const. -1.299 (0.63) *
Human	development	index 2.145 (1.04) * 6.603 (1.41) *** 6.658 (1.42) *** 6.147 (1.41) ***
Sole	proprietorship -0.453 (0.17) ** -0.362 (0.18) * -0.353 (0.18) * -0.373 (0.18) *
Education	of	owner -0.002 (0.04) -0.025 (0.04) -0.024 (0.04) -0.008 (0.04)
Employees 0.044 (0.07) 0.113 (0.07) 0.103 (0.07) 0.127 (0.07) +
Sales	(log) 0.053 (0.04) 0.020 (0.04) 0.029 (0.04) -0.005 (0.04)
Manufacturing 0.254 (0.15) + 0.184 (0.15) 0.191 (0.15) 0.205 (0.15)
Constant -4.719 (0.75) *** -6.074 (0.78) *** -6.234 (0.77) *** -5.607 (0.78) ***
Log-likelihood -899.4 -875.8 -874.7 -869.1
Chi-square 36.4 *** 87.2 *** 84.9 *** 88.3
Δchi-square 47.0 *** 2.3 11.2 **
N 5,255 5,255 5,255 5255
Model	1 Model	2 Model	4Model	3
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TABLE 4 
Supplementary Estimations 
 
 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001  
Coef. Std.	Err. Coef. Std.	Err.
Capability	constraints 0.143 (0.04) *** -0.335 (0.34)
Market	environment -0.108 (0.03) *** -1.411 (0.39) ***
Legal-judicial	institutions 0.001 (0.05) -0.812 (0.33) *
Market	env.	X	Cap.	constraints 0.012 (0.05) 0.067 (0.19)
Legal-jud.	Inst.	X	Cap.	constraints -0.127 (0.07) + -0.298 (0.25)
Market	env.	X	Legal-jud.	Inst. 0.202 (0.10) + 0.937 (0.37) *
Market	env.	X	Legal-jud.	Inst.	X	Cap.	const. -0.318 (0.18) + -1.129 (0.68) +
Human	development	index 1.705 (0.39) *** 11.745 (2.46) ***
Sole	proprietorship -0.107 (0.05) * -0.175 (0.20)
Education	of	owner -0.002 (0.01) -0.051 (0.04)
Employees 0.037 (0.02) + -0.842 (0.35) *
Sales	(log) -0.003 (0.01) 0.003 (0.04)
Manufacturing 0.060 (0.04) 0.183 (0.16)
Self-selection	correction	for	internal	financing 5.465 (2.36) *
Constant -1.744 (0.23) *** -2.412 (1.42) +
LL -801.2 -758.1
F	/	Chi-square 5.990 *** 120.7 ***
N 5,255 3,446
Tobit Logit
Selection	correctionProportion	of	microcredit
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FIGURE 1 
Interaction Effect of Market Environment, Legal-Judicial Institutions, and Capability Constraints on the Likelihood of Using 
Microcredit 
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